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1959] HANDBOOK OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE 5
JURISDICTION
Before a court can determine a right it must have the power
to act. This brings to the forefront in every cause or pro-
ceeding the problem of jurisdiction - a problem that is
sometimes difficult of solution. This handbook will not at-
tempt to cover all the variations, but will only high-light what
might be considered the most important ones.
As a back-log to this phase it will be well to familiarize
oneself with Sections 1-160 of Vol. 7 of Wests' S. C. Digest.
Of course a thorough knowledge of the provisions of the
Constitution of 1895 and the Code Sections relative to the
subject must be attained. This can be done without the aid
of a handbook. See Article 5 of the Constitution and chapter
4 and 5 of the 1952 Code and their annotations. But after that
is accomplished the trouble begins with the interpretation and
application of those provisions.
Jurisdiction of Subject Matter:
Jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be waived. See
Code Sections 10-301 to 303. As said in Riddle v. Reese
(1898), 53 S. C. 198, 31 S. E. 222, at page 202:
Finally, it is contended that the defendant, by ap-
pearing and answering, and announcing himself as ready
to go to trial, has waived this question of jurisdiction.
As we understand it, jurisdiction cannot be conferred
even by actual consent, and cannot be waived by any act
or omission of the parties. On the contrary, the ques-
tion may be, and has been, raised for the first time,
even in this Court. State v. Penny, 19 S. C., 218; Ware
.v. Henderson, supra. Indeed, it may be raised by this
Court without any motion from either of the parties.
Lowery v. Thompson, 25 S. C., 416. It is true, that juris-
diction of the person may be waived; but this is'not a case
of that character.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the Court of Common Pleas
for York County had been deprived of jurisdiction to try
this case by an act of the legislature, transferring the
case to the Court of Common Pleas for Cherokee County
before the trial was commenced, it follows that all the
proceedings leading up to the judgment, and the judg-
ment itself, are mere nullities for want of jurisdiction,
and must be so declared.
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However, there can be waiver of jurisdiction of the subject
matter, if one raises the question below and fails to appeal
from an adverse ruling. Dunlap v. Zimmerman (1938), 188
S. C. 322, 199 S. E. 296, wherein it was declared at page 329:
Appellants argue, however, that the question of the
Court's jurisdiction of the subject-matter may not be
lost, but may be raised at any time and place. This
principle, of course, is firmly settled in this State, but
it is not applicable in this appeal. The question of juris-
diction may be raised once, but when the issue has been
decided adversely to a party he cannot continue to raise
it, in different stages of the trial. His remedy is to pre-
serve his exception in the first instance, and his failure
to do so forecloses the right to again raise it.
Jurisdiction as to real property must be in the county in
which the land lies. As to this there can be no waiver even by
consent. First Nat. Co. v. Strak (1928), 148 S. C. 410, 146
S. E. 240.
Jurisdiction of the Person:
As just pointed out jurisdiction of the subject matter can-
not be waived. On the other hand jurisdiction of the person
can be waived, either expressly or impliedly. But the puzzling
question is: When is it one and not the other? Section 10-303,
formerly 422, provides that "In all other cases the action shall
be tried in the county in which the defendant resides at the
time of the commencement of the action."
In Nixon and Danforth kv. Piedmont Mut. Ins. Co. (1906),
74 S. C. 438, 54 S. E. 657, one thought it was finally ruled
that, when jurisdiction depended on the residence of the de-
fendant, the question related to jurisdiction of the subject
matter, which involved a substantial right, and could not be
waived, but, when it depended on service of a summons, it
concerned only jurisdiction of the person and could be waived,
as, for instance, by a general appearance. But even when
one is sued in the wrong county, if he is properly served,
and makes no move to have the cause transferred, and lets it
go to judgment by default, he is deemed to have waived his
substantial right to be sued in the county of his residence.
In other words a motion must be timely made. If not, it is
considered jurisdiction of the person and not of the subject
matter. As said in Rosamond v'. Lucas-Kidd Motor Co. Inc.
[Vol. 11
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(1936), 182 S. C. 331, 189 S. E. 641, quoting at page 339 from
the Lillard case in 170 S. C.:
.... 'For, while under the above-named sections of the
Code the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case on its
merits, it had jurisdiction to hear a motion to transfer
the case to the proper county, and, if the defendant had
pursued this course before time for answering expired,
the Court would have been bound to have granted the
motion. However, the defendant did not do this, and
waited until judgment had been rendered in the cause
before taking any steps in the matter. Therefore the
defendant waived the jurisdictional question, and, in ef-
fect, gave to the Court of Richland County authority to
hear the said case on its merits, and judgment was there-
after rendered in said Court against the defendant as
in any other default case. The contention is made that,
the question being a jurisdictional question, the same
could not be waived, even by the defendant - by direct
act or by failure to appear. This is true when jurisdiction
of subject-matter is involved, for the subject-matter can-
not be waived even by consent, but it is the recognized
rule of this Court that jurisdiction of the person may
be waived. Therefore, the question involved in the case
at bar being jurisdiction of the person, it is clear that
the defendant had the right to waive such question, and
under the facts of this case we must hold that the defend-
ant did waive the same by his failure to file any paper
in the cause or take any steps until after the time for
doing so prescribed under the Code had passed.'
Power of Court to Change Venue to Proper County:
Though a court, even a circuit court, may have no juris-
diction because of the case being brought in the wrong county,
and though jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be ac-
quired, even by consent, such court has the statutory power
to order the case changed to the proper county, and it even
has this power at chambers.
In applying what is now Section 10-303 it was held in Ex
Parte Jones (1931), 160 S. C. 63, 158 S. E. 134:
Although the language of the Act is mandatory, and
places exclusive jurisdiction within the county of resi-
dence [Cases cited], the Court is fully empowered under
3
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the provisions of Section 382 of the Code to change the
place of trial, among other grounds, where the county
designated in the complaint is not the proper county,
and, while the Court has no jurisdiction to try the cause
on its merits in the wrong county, even where no demand
has been made for the removal of the cause to the proper
county [Cases cited], it has jurisdiction at chambers
(Castles v. Lancaster County, 74 S. C., 512, 55 S. E. 115),
to order the place of trial changed to the proper county
(Steele v. Exum, supra; Manufacturing Company v. San-
ders, 26 S. C. 70, 1 S. E. 159; Bell v. Fludd, supra), and
it is its imperative duty to do so upon proper show-
ing....
See also Shelton v. Southern Kraft Corp. (1940), 195 S. C.
81, 10 S. E. 2d 341.
Jurisdiction of the Person:
Jurisdiction of the person, whether individual or corpora-
tion, must be by proper use of a summons, except as here-
inafter discussed, unless there be waiver as by voluntary ap-
pearance. As said in Matheson v. McCormac (1938), 186 S. C.
93, 195 S. E. 122, at page 109:
The proof of service must show affirmatively that
the service of process was correctly made. This is im-
peratively necessary to give the court jurisdiction of
the person thus sought to be brought into court.
As to voluntary appearance, one is told in Stephens v. Ring-
ling (1915), 102 S. C. 333, 86 S. E. 683, at page 342 that:
Any action by the defendant which really amounts to
an intent to be in Court is also a voluntary appearance.
And for the very reason that a defendant may choose
to come into Court with trumpets, or quietly by the back
door, the statute has not declared what act or acts shall
constitute 'appearance.'
It may be by formal writing, or it may be by informal
parol action. The act of appearance is defined to be 'a
coming into Court,' 'the first act of a defendant in
Court,' 'a submission to the jurisdiction of the Court.
Black Law Dic. 77; 2 R. C. L. 322; 3 Cyc. 502.
[Vol. 11
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Service on a Foreign Corporation:
This service must also meet the statutory requisites. The
two most troublesome questions are: (1) When is a corpora-
tion doing business within the state? And (2) When is the
individual served an agent of the corporation? Jones v. Gen.
Motors Corp. (1941), 197 S. C. 129, 14 S. E. 2d 628, answers
both questions. As to (1), on page 137, it is stated:
What constitutes 'doing business' by a foreign cor-
poration cannot be formulated in an all-embracing rule,
because the solution of the question depends upon and
is controlled by the facts of the particular case. [Cases
cited.]
We have held that where a foreign corporation sends
an agent into the State for the transaction of its cor-
porate business - a business or transaction out of which
the cause of action arises - it may be regarded as doing
business in the State to the extent that service of process
upon such agent will give the Courts of this State juris-
diction. This rule is based upon an implication arising
from the facts of the case that the corporation does
business or has business in the State for the transaction
of which it sends an agent here. It prevails where the
officer or agent is in the State with reference to the
settlement or adjustment of the claim sued upon, since in
such case the mere presence of the officer or agent for
such a purpose may be held to constitute the doing of
business in the State....
As to (2) on page 135, it is declared:
The test usually applied is, whether the agent served
sustains such relation to the corporation or to the busi-
ness out of which the alleged cause of action arose as
to justify a fair and reasonable inference of a duty on
his part to communicate the fact of service to the cor-
poration. In other words, process must be served on an
agent having such a relation to the corporation that no-
tice to the agent may well be deemed notice to the princi-
pal, without a violation of the principles of natural jus-
tice. It is not the descriptive name employed, but the
nature of the business and the extent of authority given
and exercised, which is determinative....
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However, it should be remembered that since provisions of
the United States' Constitution often come into such situa-
tions, Federal authorities are finally controlling. Thompson
v. Ford Motor Co. (1942), 200 S. C. 393, 21 S. E. 2d 34; Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945), 326 U. S. 310, 66
S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95, 161 A. L. R. 1057, and McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co. (1957), 355 U. S. 220, 78 S. Ct.
199, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223, which was followed in Ross v. American
Income Life Ins. Co. (1958), -- S. C. -- , 102 S. E. 2d 743.
See also Hanson v. Denokia (1958), - U. S. -, 78 S. Ct.
1228.
COURTS
It is important to know which courts are courts of record;
whether' limited in jurisdictional powers or not, and which are
inferior courts. As to those in the former category, as for ex-
ample a circuit court, there is the conclusive presumption,
when its judgment is attacked collaterally, and nothing ap-
pears upon the face of the proceedings, that it had jurisdic-
tion. As said in Coogler v. Crosby (1911), 89 S. C. 508, 72
S. E. 149, at page 509:
'All presumptions must be indulged in favor of the
jurisdiction of a Court of general jurisdiction. To avoid
such a judgment for want of jurisdiction the jurisdic-
tional defects must appear affirmatively on the record.'
The Court points out that there is no conclusive presump-
tion when a direct action is brought to avoid a judgment
for lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand it may be assailed
collaterally and with impunity by anybody if the lack appears
upon the face of the proceedings.
The rule as to presumption of jurisdiction relative to courts
of general jurisdiction has its exceptions. As said in EX Parte
Hart (In Re Bowen, 1937), 186 S. C. 125, 195 S. E. 253, at
page 132:
While it is not necessary that the record of the pro-
ceedings of such Court should affirmatively show the
existence of jurisdiction, Ex Parte Pearson, 79 S. C. 302,
60 S. E. 706, there are exceptions to the rule, 15 C. 3.,
Courts, § 159. Thus where the general powers of the
Court are exercised over a class of subjects not within its
ordinary jurisdiction, upon the performance of prescribed
[Vol. 11
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statutory conditions, no such presumption of jurisdiction
will attend the judgment of the Court. [Cases cited.]
As to inferior courts, for example magistrate courts, there
is no presumption that the court had jurisdiction. A judg-
ment therein may be assailed collaterally and proof will be
necessary. This makes it imperative that, when a client's
right is before an inferior tribunal, one must see to it that
the record of the proceedings shows that such tribunal had
jurisdiction, so as to either prevent an attack, or have at hand
the recorded data to succeed in winning in the event of at-
tack. Comstock & Co. v. Alexander (1844) 2 Speers 274, at
page 277, states: "But an inferior jurisdiction must, by the
record, show itself to have jurisdiction; .... "
In addition to the respective constitutional provisions, the
various courts and their functions, are dealt with in detail in
Title 15, Vol. 2, 1952 Code, beginning at page 475.
County Courts:
Particular attention is called to the county courts. Chapter
5 of the Title 15, deals with them. Art. 1 of that chapter it
will be noted is inclusive of the General Enabling Act of 1900
as amended. Courts established thereunder like the courts
established under the Acts relating to certain counties (See
Art. 2 through Art. 6 of Chapter 5), are all courts of record,
though of limited jurisdiction, and therefore are not classed
as "inferior" courts in the strict meaning of that word.
The General Enabling Act, now Sections 15-601 to 15-678
is not operative as to a county court unless the court was es-
tablished under it. Pickens v. Maxwell Bros. & Quinn (1935),
176 S. C. 404, 180 S. E. 348. In fact, there are only a few
counties in which it could be operative as 35 counties are
expressly excepted from the Act. Section 15-627.
It appears that no presently existing county court in South
Carolina was established under that Act. Each such court
has been established otherwise by specific legislation as shown
by Articles 2 to 6 of Chapter 5. Since one finds that the
powers and functions of each such court vary, one must care-
fully follow the Article under which each is functioning. And
the Code Sections should-be shepardized to date as substan-
tial changes may be made in any year. For example in 1956
criminal jurisdiction was added in the Richland County Court.
See Acts of 1956, page 1704.
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Powers with which the Constitution has invested circuit
courts the legislature cannot take away and confer upon a
county court. At most only concurrent jurisdiction can be
conferred. Strickland v. Seaboard A. L. Ry. Co. (1918), 112
S. C. 67, 98 S. E. 853.
Other Courts:
Municipal courts (Chapter 6, page 595, Vol. 2 of Code);
Juvenile & Domestic Relations Courts (Chapter 7, page 619) ;
Children's Courts (Chapter 8, page 659) ; Magistrate Courts
(Title 43, page 637)-all are inferior courts with appeal to
the circuit court.
It would take too much space to specifically set forth the
various magistrate courts of the state, as they vary in differ-
ent counties, sometimes as to functions; sometimes as to juris-
diction. For instance, in Anderson county the magistrate re-
siding in the City of Anderson or within seven miles is desig-
nated as a "county judge"; that court has jurisdiction in civil
cases of not over $1,000 except where it involves title to real
estate or a counterclaim of more than $1,000 is pleaded. Sec-
tions 43-532 to 536. The magistrate in Sumter and Concord
Townships in Sumter county, including the city of Sumter,
also has a special jurisdiction. Section 43-1038. It will thus
be seen that reference must always be had to the sections
controlling in any particular county to ascertain magisterial
jurisdiction therein.
Particular attention is called to the rule that in an inferior
court, or in one of limited jurisdiction, a party may reduce
a claim involving a money demand in order to bring a cause
or a counterclaim within the courts' jurisdiction but any
amount so abated cannot thereafter be the basis of a suit.
However, where the counterclaim is beyond the jurisdictional
limit its interposition doesn't oust jurisdiction of the plain-
tiff's action. Stroy v. Nicpee (1916), 105 S. C. 265, 89 S. E.
666, DuPre v. Gilland (1930), 156 S. C. 109, 152 S. E. 873.
With regard to jurisdiction of a magistrate court it is impera-
tive that the statutory requirements be met. However, no
presumption is indulged in that an inferior court had juris-
diction, as is done with a court of general jurisdiction, so one
must always see to it that the record or proceedings in a
magistrate court shows "everything necessary to give juris-
diction". Benson v. Carrier (1887), 28 S. C. 119, 121. It was
[Vol. 11
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also held therein that, as to jurisdiction of the person, waiver
can give jurisdiction.
As to serving of process in magistrate courts, there are
different time limits for certain proceedings which must never
be confused and which are later set forth herein.
The Domestic Relations Court in Laurens County (Chapter
7.1, page 656) is "one of record" with appeal direct to the
Supreme Court. The inference would seem to follow that the
presumption as to jurisdiction would apply to that court.
The Civil Court of Darlington County (Chapter 9.1, page
701), and the Civil Court of Florence (Chapter 10, page 705),
like the existing County Courts are inferably courts of record,
though of limited jurisdiction, and an appeal is direct to the
Supreme Court. This would appear to be true of the Florence
Court, though Sections 15-1601 describes it as "A Court in-
ferior to the Circuit Court", which tends to leave one in doubt.
The City Court of Charleston (Chapter 9, page 684), though
an inferior court, has appeal direct to the Supreme Court.
Section 15-1579. As declared in City Council of Charleston v.
Weller (1890), 34 S. C. 357, 13 S. E. 628, at page 360:
.... While, therefore, the City Court of Charleston was
not declared in terms by that case to be an inferior court,
yet we think that such is the necessary inference from
that decision.
and at page 362:
.... while as a general rule in appeals from the decisions
of an inferior court the appeal is to the Circuit Court, yet
the City Court constitutes an exception, and an appeal
from that court is to be heard and determined by the
Supreme Court.
Probate Courts:
Probate courts are courts of record, though appeal there-
from is to the circuit court and not to the Supreme Court.
Here again, as with the Domestic Relations Court in Laurens
County, the inference would seem to follow that the presump-
tion as to jurisdiction would prevail. Also as to when a "Pro-
bate Court's decision" will be accepted by the U. S. Supreme
Court as "evidencing" the law of a state, see Pitts v. Ham-
rick (1955), 228 Fed. 2d 486.
There is no doubt that a judgment or decree admitting a will
to probate is conclusive except only on direct attack. As said
9
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in Davis v. Davis (1949), 214 S. C. 247, 52 S. E. 2d 192, at
page 258:
As stated in 68 C. J. p. 874, the probate of a will is
in nature a proceeding in rem, wherein all persons having
any interest are deemed parties and concluded by the de-
cision therein. Our conclusion in this case is further con-
firmed by the following citation from 68 C. J. pp. 1228,
1229: 'Conclusiveness of Proceedings - (a) In General.
As a proceeding to probate a will is a judicial one, a
judgment or decree admitting a will to probate stands on
the same footing as a judgment of any other court of
competent jurisdiction; and, while it is not conclusive
in the sense that a person having the requisite interest
may not attack it by a direct proceeding within the period
of time allowed by statute, without a statute conferring
the right to contest, the order admitting the will to pro-
bate would be final on all parties .....
As to conclusiveness of presumption of jurisdiction of a
court of record, see Ex Parte Darby (1930), 157 S. C. 434,
154 S. E. 632.
The Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Burnett v. Burnside
(1890), 33 S. C. 276, 11 S. E. 387, while holding that under
the existing circumstances the probate judge was not sub-
j ect to mandamus, ruled as follows on page 278:
.... The Court of Probate, though of limited jurisdiction,
is a court of record with large powers, and as to proceed-
ings within its jurisdiction cannot be said to be, in the
ordinary sense of the term, and inferior court. The func-
tions of the court are judicial and not merely ministerial
- resting on the discretion of the judge, not only in
making the order of sale, but in executing titles. Besides,
if that court commits error, the remedy is by appeal, and,
as we understand it, that is the only manner in which
the Court of Common Pleas can review and correct its
proceedings.
Attention is called to the fact that the probate court in
Charleston County is a constitutional court, the powers of
which the legislature cannot change, while those of all other
counties are not. Hence, " . . . . in any or all of the other
counties the Legislature may vest the jurisdiction formerly
exercised by the probate court, or any part of it, in other
[Vol. 11
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courts, as it may deem expedient". Bradford v. Richardson
(1918), 111 S. C. 205, 212, 97 S. E. 58. See also City Council
v. Weller (1890), 34 S. C. 357, at page 360; 13 S. E. 628,
wherein it is pointed out that appeal from a probate court is
to the circuit court, thus indicating it is an inferior court,
though one of record.
City Council; When a Court, When Not:
A city council may be invested with judicial power. On the
other hand, it may be exercising only administrative author-
ity. Ex Parte Evans (1905), 72 S. C. 547, 52 S. E. 419, at
page 551, points out the distinction thus:
Section 6 provides a penalty for failure to comply with
this ordinance.
This would doubtless give the city council jurisdiction
as a court to try offenses for a violation of said city ordi-
nance, if sustained as valid, but no such authority is at-
tempted to be exercised in the present matter, but it
confers no authority upon the city council as a court to
hear and determine a controversy arising between neigh-
bors as to whether the owner shall have the right or a
permit to build a certain kind of house upon her premises.
In so far as the city council may assume to grant or re-
fuse such a permit, their action is administrative rather
than judicial. Their decision in such matters is not bind-
ing in the sense of a judgment of a court. The applica-
tion for a permit is ex parte. If objection be offered, that
does not raise a controversy between the petitioner and
the objector which is submitted to the judicial authority
of the city, council. As the city council was not acting in
the capacity of a court in the premises, there was no
case before the city council for which a right of appeal
is saved in art. V., sec. 15, of the Constitution....
Before leaving the subject of courts and their jurisdictional
powers, attention is briefly called to the following: judicial
function as distinguished from that of other branches of the
government: Ex Parte Tillman (1910), 84 S. C. 552, 66 S. E.
1049, 26 L. R. A. U. S. Jrisdiction of intermediate court suf-
ficient: Senn v. Spartanburg County '(1940), 192 S. E. 489,
7 S. E. 2d 454. Jurisdiction as to injunction in condemnation
case must be in county where the lands are situated: Augusta
et. Co. v. Savannah River Elec. Co. (1929), 152 S. C. 295,
11
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149 S. E. 924. As to subject of the action, novation of an obli-
gation, and requirement that agreements of attorneys be in
writing: Ophuls & Hill, Inc. v. Car. Ice & Fuel Co. (1931),
160 S. C. 441, 158 S. E. 824, 827. Actions, when transitory
and when local; also venue as to same: Odell Hardware Co. V.
Scarborough's, Inc. (1938), 186 S. C. 370, 195 S. E. 631.
Also, when is foreign corporation doing business in the
state, where plaintiff is a resident, cause arose out of the
state, and corporation's agent was served: Lipe 'v. C. C. & 0.
Ry. (1923), 123 S. C. 515, 116 S. E. 101; see also, McSwain
v. Adams Grain etc. Co. (1912), 93 S. C. 103, 76 S. E. 117, as
to when is one an agent upon whom service will be sufficient.
One will be held to be an agent, upon whom proper service
can be made, even though contract says there is no such
agency: McNeil et al. v. Elec. etc. Battery Co. et al. (1917),
109 S. C. 326, 96 S. E. 134; jurisdiction of parties after repeal
of statute: Trapier v. Waldo (1881), 16 S. C. 276; it is the
function of a court and not a jury to decide a factual issue as
to jurisdiction. Bargesser v. Coleman Co. (1957), 230 S. C.
562, 96 S. E. 2d 825.
[Vol. Ii
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